Five people from the list below will become the members of the Community Committee (CC). Assign weights to each person according to how much you want them to be in the committee (higher weight = higher preference).
The system will assume you want to maximise the sum of weights of selected candidates. E.g. if X is given a weight of 10 and Y and Z have weights 8 and 6 respectively, then the voting algorithm will assume you prefer a committee with both Y and Z over one with X, because 14 > 10. However, giving Y and Z weight of 4 and 2 instead would have expressed that X is preferred to a combination of Y and Z, because 6 < 10.
The apparent winner of this poll was the set of choices ( 5,6,7,8,9,10 ):
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There are 210 possible sets of 6 choices that can be formed by selecting from the 10 choices. Of these, 15 sets were considered thoroughly, comparing against the 68 nearby (similar) sets that differ in just one choice.
This is the voting preference matrix, reporting maximal valid proportional preferences. Fractional digits indicate nonproportional preferences, which help break ties in proportional preference.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. (5,6,7,8,9,10) | - | 0.16 | 0.2 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 26.26 | 26.26 | 29.28 | 28.28 | 27.27 | 29.3 | 29.29 | 27.27 | |
| 2. (2,5,7,8,9,10) | 0.1 | - | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 23.24 | 26.26 | 28.27 | 27.27 | 28.28 | 29.29 | 28.28 | 28.27 | |
| 3. (1,5,7,8,9,10) | 0.1 | 0.11 | - | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 23.25 | 22.21 | 23.23 | 26.26 | 25.25 | 27.26 | 26.26 | 25.25 | |
| 4. (1,5,6,8,9,10) | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.1 | - | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 22.24 | 23.21 | 27.27 | 25.24 | 26.26 | 28.27 | 27.27 | 26.26 | |
| 5. (1,4,5,8,9,10) | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.12 | - | 0.1 | 0.16 | 22.23 | 21.19 | 23.23 | 25.25 | 22.22 | 26.25 | 26.26 | 25.25 | |
| 6. (1,4,5,7,9,10) | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.13 | 0.06 | - | 0.16 | 18.2 | 19.18 | 23.23 | 24.24 | 22.22 | 26.25 | 25.25 | 23.23 | |
| 7. (1,4,5,6,9,10) | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.1 | - | 22.23 | 18.18 | 25.25 | 23.23 | 22.22 | 27.25 | 26.26 | 25.25 | |
| 8. (1,3,4,5,6,10) | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.1 | 0.09 | 0.07 | - | 0.16 | 17.17 | 0.16 | 16.2 | 19.18 | 19.19 | 21.21 | |
| 9. (2,3,4,5,6,7) | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.14 | - | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.2 | 0.19 | |
| 10. (1,2,4,5,6,7) | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.1 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.14 | - | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 17.19 | |
| 11. (1,3,4,5,6,7) | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.13 | - | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 17.19 | |
| 12. (1,2,3,5,6,7) | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.1 | - | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.16 | |
| 13. (1,2,3,4,6,7) | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.15 | - | 0.15 | 18.19 | |
| 14. (1,2,3,4,5,7) | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.12 | 0.08 | - | 16.16 | |
| 15. (1,2,3,4,5,6) | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.1 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.1 | - |
You can compare any two sets of choices. Just enter the numbers of the choices (from 1 to 10) in each set, with the numbers of one set's choices in the left column and the numbers of the other's in the right column.
The following gives the details of how the poll would have resulted if run on single choices, without proportional representation. This hypothetical poll defines the “individual preference order” used above.
Winning choices are shown in bold.
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